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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
WALLACE R. SMITH, dba SMITH
REALTY COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

Case No. 8302

C. TAYLOR BURTON,
De jendant, Respondent and
Cross-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND
CROSS-APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Respondent and cross-appellant, C. Taylor Burton, is cross-appealing to the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah from that part of the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment of the Honorable
Joseph C. Jeppson dated the 17th of November,
1954, which award to plaintiff the sum of $2,000.00,
together with interest and costs and this Brief is
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filed in support of such cross-appeal and as an answer to appellant's Brief hertofore filed on his
appeal.
Throughout this Brief, appellant will be referred to as plaintiff and respondent and crossappellant will be referred to as defendant. All
italics are ours.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
To the extent that defendant does not disagree
with the Statement of Facts made in plaintiff's
Brief, he will refrain from repeating such facts, and
will confine his statement to facts as to which he
may disagree with plaintiff or which he feels were
omitted by plaintiff.
On January 31, 1953, plaintiff, as broker negotiated an exchange of seven duplexes and certain
personal property, subject to outstanding indebtedness, belonging to defendant, for a certain ranch
belonging to Elder, subject to a mortgage, Exhibit
No. 1. No values of any properties are mentioned
therein, but a value of $19,000.00 per duplex, for
trade purposes only was assigned by defendant,
( R.243), which was a fictitious value and greatly in
excess of the real or cash value (R.25, 28, 29, 30, 31,
40,46,49,69,243).
There existed no listing on the Elder property
prior to the exchange (R.44, 45) and instead of the
usual brokerage charge, plaintiff and defendant entered into a special written agreement, written in
ink on the reverse side of Exhibit 1, and later an
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amplification thereof, Exhibit 2, under which it was
agreed that plaintiff should be paid for his services
on the exchange with Elder, Exhibit 1, and for the
sale of two remaining duplexes, by transfer of defendant's equity in a third remaining duplex, provided that title to the duplex should be given only
when plaintiff should have disposed of the two remaining duplexes. This Agreement, Exhibit 2, also
provides that "In the event the broker shall sell first
party's duplexes for a sum greater than $17,000.00
net, then and in event the broker shall be entitled to
retain such excess of money as further Commission
compensation for his efforts".
The parties discussed the terms of Exhibit 2
before signing it and it was understood that plaintiff would be entitled to retain any excess over
$17,000.00 only if cash sale, that cash sale was contemplated and not a trade (R. 10, 33).
Being anxious to obtain title to his duplex,
(R. 181, 184), on May 1, 1953, plaintiff presented
to defendant a proposition to exchange the two remaining duplexes, together with other personal and
real properties, subject to mortgages owing on
them, plus $3,000.00 cash, for a ranch adjacent to
the Elder property, owned by Frank W. Toone.
Plaintiff and defendant discussed the matter and the
question of how such commission would become due
from defendant to plaintiff for such exchange, including the two duplexes, and how and under what
conditions it would become payable. Plaintiff told
defendant he could rent the pasture on the ranches
for at least $4,000.00 for the season and since Bur-
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ton was short of cash, ( R.94) it was agreed that
Smith would take the responsibility of renting the
property and accept one-half of the rental, not exceeding $2,000.00, plus the horse, saddle, and bridle
as payment in full for the commission on the Toone
exchange Exhibit 3, including the two duplexes (R.

34,35, 193,194, 191,229).
Having satisfied himself that he would not have
to raise any money for commission, that plaintiff,
who wanted to make the deal so he could get title to
his duplex, would accept one-half of what he could
get as rental, not exceeding a maximum of $2,000.00,
as his commission, then ·and only then, did defendant
sign the commission agreement, Exhibit 7. It was
signed ahead of the Toone exchange agreement, Exhibit 3, ( R. 15, 38).
On May 12, 1953, plaintiff presented to defendant a new commission agreement, prepared by
plaintiff for defendant's signature, Exhibit 8, which
defendant refused to sign, explaining that it did not
conform to their agreement, as it would impose on
him an obligation to pay the $2,000.00 commission,
whether plaintiff rented the pastures or not, which
was contrary to their understanding and to their
written agreement embodied in Exhibit 7. This proposed agreement made no mention of any commission other than the $2,000.00 as being due Smith
( R. 17, 18, 36, 189, 190).

Plaintiff never made claim or even mentioned
to defendant the $4,000.00 or any other amount as
additional commission due him under Exhibit 2,
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5
until this action was commenced in December 1953
(R. 37, 231, 232), more than seven months after the
last transaction.
The only sale or exchange ever negotiated by
plaintiff of the two duplexes was the exchange to
Toone under Exhibit 3 (R. 41, 44, 188, 189, 191,
193).
Plaintiff did not lease or rent the pastures to
anyone during the 1953 season or at all, nor present
a definite offer of lease, and no rental was realized
therefrom. ( R. 215).
The lower court correctly found that there became due plaintiff, as commission, under the terms
of Exhibit 2 (R. 253, Finding No. 5) a duplex subject to an outstanding mortgage, which was later
deeded to plaintiff, but that no further commission
was earned or became due plaintiff thereunder,
since he failed to make a cash sale for more than
$17,000.00.
The court found that defendant and plaintiff
entered into the agreement of May 1, 1953, Exhibit
7, and that it was the understanding of the parties
at the time of its execution that if plaintiff did not
receive $2,000.00 commission from the rental of the
pasture by November 1, 1953, that said sum
would be due and payable from defendant to
plaintiff, that no part thereof had been paid and
that defendant was indebted to plaintiff for the sum
of $2,000.00 (R. 253, in Finding No. 6). Based on
said finding the court entered its Conclusions of Law
(R. 254) and Decree (R. 255), granting judgment
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to plaintiff, for $2,000.00 with interest at 6o/o from
November 1, 1953 and costs. The court, in Finding
#8, ( R. 254) found that the commission agreements,
Exhibits 2 and 7, did not merge but remained separate and distinct agreements throughout the dealings between plaintiff and defendant.

It is from the finding that it was the understanding of the parties at the time of the execution
of Exhibit 7 that if plaintiff did not receive
$2,000.00 commission from the rental of the pasture
by November 1, 1953 that said sum would then be
due and payable by defendant to plaintiff, and the
Conclusions of Law based thereon and the Decree
of the court awarding plaintiff said judgment, that
defendant and cross-appellant appeals.
Defendant also appeals from Finding #8 (R.
254) aforementioned.
Defendant's chief objection is to the Finding
in paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fact that "it was
the understanding of the parties at the time of the
execution of Exhibit 7, that if plaintiff did not receive his $2,000.00 commission from the rental of
the pasture by November 1, 1953, that said sum
would be due and payable from defendant to plaintiff", and to the Conclusions of Law and Decree
based theron.
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STATEMENTS OF POINTS RELIED UPON.
FIRST AS TO THE CROSS APPEAL.
POINT I.
COMMISSION AGREEMENT, EXHIBIT 7,
DEFINITELY LIMITS PLAINTIFF'S COMMISSION FOR SERVICE IN THE TOONE EXCHANGE DEAL, EXHIBIT 3, TO ONE-HALF
OF RENTAL FEE FOR PASTURE FOR 1953
SEASON, UNTIL $2,000.00 IS SO REALIZED,
PLUS A HORSE, SADDLE AND BRIDLE,
PLAINTIFF TO RENT THE PASTURE.
(a) It was a contingent fee.
(b) The contingency never occurred, the pas-

tures were never rented, and no commission became due.
(c) There is no competent evidence to support
the finding and judgment of the lower
court against defendant, and such judgment should be reversed and set aside.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
COMMISSION AGREEMENT, EXHIBIT 7,
DEFINITELY LIMITS PLAINTIFF'S COMMISSION FOR SERVICE IN THE TOONE EXCHANGE DEAL, EXHIBIT 3, TO ONE-HALF
OF RENTAL FEE FOR PASTURE FOR 1953
SEASON, UNTIL $2,000.00 IS SO REALIZED,
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PLUS A HORSE, SADDLE AND BRIDLE,
PLAINTIFF TO RENT THE PASTURE.
(a) It was a contingent fee.

Fortunately, this agrement was committed to
writing, signed by both parties, and couched in such
clear, unmistakable language as to leave no need
or room for parole testimony to explain or construe
its terms. It would be difficult for anyone, even a
lawyer, in so few words to write a more clear or
understandable agreement. Nothing is left in doubt.
The law, in such cases, is elementary, holding
as stated in the syllabus of the Utah case of Fox
Film Corporation v. Ogden Theatre Company, 1932,
17 P. 2d, 294; 90 A.L.R. 1299:
"In the absence of fraud, or mistake, parole evidence is not admisible to contradict,
vary, add to, or subtract from the terms of a
valid written instrument which purports to
set forth the entire contract of the parties".
To the same general effect see 20 Am. Juris. 958,
963, 964, 968, 989, 990. At page 991 the following:
"A written agreement dealing with the
amount, time, and manner of payment is ordinarily conclusively to be presumed to embody all that element of the oral negotiation."
Furthermore, plaintiff, if he is to recover at all,
must, as stated by this court in Case v. Ralph, 188
P. 640, base his claim on a written instrument covering all terms of his employment, showing his authority to sell, the amount, terms, and conditions
upon which his commission is to be paid. The court
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there construed a section of our Statute of Frauds,
which is now Section 25-5-4, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, which provides:
"Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or
sell real estate for compensation"
shall be void unless in writing.
In this case, the entire problem of commission
is covered by special agreements, Exhibits 2 and 7.
It is not a case of paying the usual broker's commission on values of property sold. All testimony given
at the trial on these subjects was clearly incompetent and irrelevant and contrary to the parole evidence rule. In its final determination of the case, the
lower court seems to have recognized this and confined itself to construing the two commission agreements, Exhibits 2 and 7. Plaintiff testified that he
was accustomed to making special contracts for commission on transactions involving exchange of properties (R. 186, 197, 223). Plaintiff, Smith, was accustomed to handling large ranch deals involving
exchanges and to making unusual arrangements for
commission, sometimes getting more than the usual
commission and sometimes less, sometimes payable
in cash and sometimes in property, as in Exhibit 2.
Here, plaintiff was anxious to negotiate a disposition of defendant's two remaining duplexes because only by so doing could he get title to the duplex
which was commission for the Elder transaction and
on the two duplexes. Remember, he had already
collected full commission of $4,050.00 from Elder
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and later also $2,628.00 from Toone, besides the
duplex, with an equity value placed by Smith at
$7400.00, from defendant (R. 210) or a total, including the horse, saddle and bridle, conveyed to him
by defendant, value at $150.00, of $13,214.45 (R.
211).
Should plaintiff recover what he asks in this
action, he would, in effect, be collecting from defendant three commissions on the two duplexes, besides
collecting in full from the other parties to the exchanges:
1st, $7400.00 equity in duplex, which covered
commission on Elder deal and on two duplexes, which
figures considerably over a 5% commission;
2d, the $4,000.00 plaintiff seeks under Exhibit
2, which would be over a 10% commission on plaintiff's own trade value set on the two duplexes, but
over 12% of the real value of approximately $32,000.00; and,
3rd, The $2,150.00 cash, a horse, saddle and
bridle under Exhibit 7, which would be at a rate of
more than 51;2% of the $38,000.00 value of the Toone
property, or a total commission on the two duplexes
of over 221;2% of their value.
He really hadn't done so badly, and it wasn't
unusual or unlikely that he would enter into the contingent fee agreement, Exhibit 7, providing that he
would get one-half of the rental on the ranches for
the 1953 season until he had realized $2,000.00 more,
and that he would assume the responsibility of renting the ranches. Only by such an arrangement could
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he get title to his duplex ( R. 181) and besides, he
was an old hand at dealing in ranches. He told defendant that he could rent the pasture for $4,000.00
or $5,000.00 for the 1953 season (R. 228, 229). He
was very confident. Besides he had everything to
gain and nothing to lose. He and defendant had full
discussion and only after plaintiff agreed to this
contingent fee arrangement, did defendant agree to
the exchange. ( R. 229). There was no discussion
about the commission becoming due on November
1, 1953, or at all, if $2,000.00 were not realized as
rent. It would have been pointless for defendant to
have written and signed this agreement, limiting his
obligation and commission to one-half of the rents
collected if in fact he had agreed to unconditional
payment by November 1. One looks in vain for any
date of November 1, 1953 in Exhibit 7 or for any
statement indicating that the commission of $2,000.00 was to be paid in any event, whether realized
from the pasture or not. On the contrary, it is a
clear, logical, unambiguous, contingent fee agreement, needing no clarification, entered into by two
experienced businessmen with their eyes wide open,
and for the distinct advantage of the plaintiff. It is
not within the prerogative of the court to attempt to
write a new contract for the parties. One might just
as well cut the heart out of the human body and
expect to have anything left as to cut out of this
agreement the contingency element, limiting the
amount of commission to one-half of the rent received for pasture, and to substitute therefor an unconditional agreement to pay the commission by No-
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vember 1. The agreement of the parties would be
completely emasculated and annihilated, bearing no
resemblance to their understanding. This the court
cannot do.
Every day attorneys are entering into contingent fee agreements on accident and other types of
cases. So are real estate brokers. Every time they
take a listing on real estate they enter into such a
contingent commission agreement. If they sell, they
are paid. If not, they get nothing. In this case, if
plaintiff rented the pasture for $4,000.00 he would
be paid $2,000.00. If not, he would get just one-half
of all rent received.
Later on May 12, 1953, after thinking it over
for nearly two weeks, he concluded to get a better
agreement, so presented Exhibit 8 to defendant,
providing that he would get his $2,000.00 in any
event. Defendant promptly declined to execute it,
telling plaintiff it didn't correspond to their previous
agreement (R. 17, 18, 36).
(b) The contingency net'er occurred and no
commission became due.
Having established that the commission agreement, Exhibit 7, was a contingent fee agreement,
entitling plaintiff to a commission only out of rent
received for pasture during 1953 season, it simply
remains to determine what amount was collected as
rent, and what plaintiff's one-half share is.
There is no conflict in the evidence to the effect
that no rent was received ( R. 215). Since the contingency never occurred, which would entitle plainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tiff to a commission under Exhibit 7, he was entitled
to none, except the horse, saddle and bridle which
were conveyed.
(c) There is no competent evidence to support
the finding and judgment of the lower
court against defendant, and such judgment should be reversed and set aside.
We submit that there is no con1petent evidence
to support the Finding and Decree entered against
defendant and that the lower court erred in its finding that defendant owed plaintiff $2,000.00 and in
entering judgment for that amount, and we urge
that the judgment be reversed and set side.
SECOND: NOW, AS TO PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD
THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO
$4,000.00 OR ANY OTHER AMOUNT OF ADDITIONAL COMMISSION FROM DEFENDANT,
BEYOND THE DUPLEX, UNDER THE COMMISSION AGREEMENT OF FEBRUARY 17,
1953, EXHIBIT 2.
(a) A transfer of the duplex to plaintiff was
the entire commission for sale or exchange
of the remaining two duplexes, unless a
cash sale were made, in which event plaintiff could retain such excess of money over
$17,000.00 as further commission. No cash
sale was made and no money received,
which could be retained. Hence, no further
commission became due plaintiff.
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ARGUMENT
POINT II, AND PARAGRAPH (a) THEREOF.

We think the trial court erred in finding, Finding #8, (R. 254), that the two agreements, numbers
2 and 7, did not merge but remained separate and
distinct agreements throughout the dealings between plaintiff and defendant. In our opinion, Exhibit 2 merged in Exhibit 7 or was superceded and
replaced by it as to the part involving any additional
commission which might become due for sale of the
two duplexes, but that will be argued later in this
Brief. The court did find that Exhibit 2 provided
for additional commission for sale of the two duplexes only if sold for more than $17,000.00 cash
each; that no such sale was made ·and therefore no
additional commission became due. We shall limit
this part of our argument to support of the court's
finding in this respect and in opposition to plaintiff's appeal therefrom.
The trial court based its decision, denying
plaintiff additional compensation on an interpretation of the memo on the back of Exhibit 1 and the
agreement of February 17, 1953, Exhibit 2. We
think it was correct in this interpretation. As plaintiff says in his Brief, these must be considered together. The first memo nowhere refers to "exchange", but only to "sale". No reference is made
to any additional commission to plaintiff beyond the
duplex. The addition of the words "will accept reasonable terms", does not imply an exchange, but
merely that the cash might be accepted on reasonSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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able terms. Plaintiff certainly can get no comfort or
support from this original agreement. Plaintiff cites,
at page 8 of his Brief, as authority to show that this
is a sale rather than an exchange, the Utah case of
Blackburn vs. Bozo, but this case is clearly distinguishable on its facts, from the one at bar. There,
after providing for sale for cash, it said:
"Or any other terms that may be agreeable to
me".
The court held the broker was entitled to commission. That was clearly different from our case. Exhibit 1 referred only to "sale", which necessarily
must be presumed to be for cash, and merely adds:
"Will accept reasonable terms", which clearly means
cash terms, and our parties passed on to Exhibit 2,
seventeen days later, to fortify defendant's position
by again referring to "sale" and saying that "excess
of money" could be retained. That clearly reaffirmed
that a sale for money was mandatory as a condition
for additional commission. The cases are entirely
different.
After plaintiff had had seventeen days to think
it over, he prepared and had signed by defendant
Exhibit 2. Therefore, in interpreting the contract
"it must be construed most strongly against him"
as stated in the Utah case of Mifflin v. Shiki, 293
P.l.
Now what does this greatly disputed document,
Exhibit 2, really provide? It seems to us that it
really divides itself off into two rather well defined
parts. First, it provides for the transfer to plaintiff
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by defendant of a duplex as commission for the
Elder transaction and future disposition, yet to be
made, of defendant's two remaining duplexes. And,
second, it provides that if plaintiff sells the two duplexes for a sum greater than $17,000.00 net each,
"then and in event the Broker shall be entitled to
retain such excess of money as a further commission".
It should be observed that whenever the term
"exchange" is used alone or the words "sale or exchange" are used together in said agreement, they
refer to the requirement that defendant transfer to
plaintiff, title to the duplex and fix the time when
and conditions under which he shall do so. In other
words, on a sale or exchange of the duplexes for
$17,000.00 net, the deed must issue, but,-and this
is important-in the part of the agreement referring to possible additional commission, we find no
use of the word "exchange", but only the words
"sale" and the provision that such commission shall
be realized by permitting plaintiff to "retain such
excess of money". Plaintiff must look to this one sentence alone for his rights. These words, taken together, can mean only a "sale" and not an "exchange".
One can retain only something which has theretofore come into his possession. He could retain only
"such excess m01ney". No money had come into plaintiff's possession. How then could he retain it? Fortunately we are not left in the wilderness by the
courts on this distinction between "sale" and "exchange."
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Perhaps our best Utah case on the subject of
broker's commission defining "sale", which is based
upon facts quite similar to ours, is Watson v. Odell,
198 P. 772. It says:
"A sale is ordinarily understood to mean
a transfer of property for money".
Further, "No commission was payable
except in the event of a consummation of a
sale, and no commission was payable except
as the purchase price was paid. These contracts required more from the plaintiff than
merely to find a purchaser able, willing, and
ready to buy. The actual payment of the purchase price was required, and only after the
purchase price was paid were the commission
installments due and payable * * * . Under
our statute the plaintiff could recover his
commission only by virtue of his contract.
He could not recover on quantum meruit".
In our case, plaintiff could recover, if at all, only
under a special contract and only by retaining part
of money collected. He collected none. There was no
money to retain.
In the case of Mifflin v. Shiki, supra, a case
very similar to this one it is said, in the syllabus and
body,
"Contract must be construed more
strongly against one preparing it".
"Broker effecting exchange of properties, instead of sale, cannot recover commission unless written contract specifically provides therefor".
Again,
"Neither did the court err in considering the contract as being one for sale rather
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than for an exchange, and that the commission of 109'o (which is much higher than the
usual commission charged by real estate
brokers for such service) was payable to the
broker only upon procuring a purchaser for
a money consideration''.
Plaintiff's Brief, at page 11, cites the California
case of Robbins vs. Pacific Eastern Corporation as
authority for claiming that an exchange is in fact
two sales. That case is no authority in the case at
bar, because it is based entirely on a California
statute. Utah has no similar statute.
The Wyoming case of Murphy v. W & W Livestock Company, 189 P. 857 holds:
"Where by the contract of employment,
the commission is made upon certain conditions and contingencies, as upon the actual
consummation of the sale, or the full payment
of the purchase money * * * these stipulations will govern, and a fulfillment of performance of the prescribed conditions is generally essential to the right to compensation".
In Lindley v. Fay, 119 Cal. 239, 51 P. 333, we
find:
"Under the contract of March 7, the
commission was to be paid out of proceeds of
sale, when received, and unless a payment be
made, no commission would be due".
Apple v. Henry, 213 P. 444, a Montana case,
quotes with approval from Williamson v. Berry, 12
L. Ed. 1170, wherein the Supreme Court of the
United States says:
"Sale is a word of precise legal import,
both at law ·and in equity. It means at all
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times a contract ·between the parties to give
and to pass rights of property for money,
which the buyer pays or promises to pay to
the seller for the things bought or sold."
Finally the Colorado court in Thompson v.
Alley, 238 P. 62 held:
·
"Broker, suing on contract to pay commission for sale of property, cannot recover
thereon, where parties exchanged properties
encumbered on both sides, but is limited to
compensation on quantum meruit for services
performed, such transaction not being a
sale".
Nothing was received by the plaintiff for the
two duplexes and the only thing received by defendant for thenl, other ~ personal and real property
and $3,000.00 cash1was a ranch, one indivisible piece
of property. No part of that could be retained by
plaintiff and the only way he could get his claimed
$4,000.00 additional commission, would be for defendant to advance that much cash, a burden he
might not be able to discharge. Plaintiff testified
that defendant didn't have any money, because of
the two big subdivisions he was developing, (R. 94)
and wanted him to take his commission in other than
money. Burton testified that the agreement in Exhibit 2 to pay extra commission was based on a
cash sale and that a trade or exchange was not contemplated. (R. 10, 33).
Defendant actually received less, even in property, than $17,000.00 real value or cash equivalent
for his two duplexes in the trade with Toone, Exhibit 3. Toone had placed an inflated, fictitious value,
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for trade purposes, of $52,578.00 on his ranch, (R.
25, 29). The real value was only $38,400.00. (R. 28).
The parties were merely trading equities on higher
than cash value. (R. 29, 243). He didn't receive as
much as $17,000.00 real value for the duplexes (R.
31, 40). Burton figured the real value of each duplex $15,250.00 (R. 49). He increased his fictitious
trade value on each Toone duplex at least $3,000.00,
to meet Toone's inflated value (R. 29), and the trading price of each of the Elder duplexes was boosted
about $3500.00 ( R. 36). Toone finally sold his two
duplexes for $14,750.00 and $15,000.00 gross, respectively, from which he had to pay 5% commission (R. 30, 69). Smith offered the duplex which
he received for $16,000.00 (R. 31). So, it is conclusively shown that Burton got less than $17,000.00
real value, even in property, for his duplexes and
that the $19,000.00 fictitious trade value meant absolutely nothing. This destroys all plausibility that
he would have made such a deal, if in doing so he
would subject himself to the necessity of going out
and raising $4,000.00 spot cash to pay additional
commission.
The courts hold that the chief object in construing contracts is to ascertain the intention of the
contracting parties and subsequent actions and conduct of the parties may be considered, in arriving at
the intention. See Gladys Belle Oil Company v. Clark,
et al, 296 P. 461, an Oklahoma case, decided in 1931.
Brockway v. Blair, 53 Mont. 531; 165 P. 455.
Burroughs v. Petroleum Development Co. 184
P. 5; 181 Cal. 253.
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Luitweiler Pumping Engine Co. v. Ukiah Water
& Improvement Co. 116 P. 707, 16 Cal. App. 198.

Utah Con. Co. v. Mcllwee, 266 P. 1094, 45 Idaho 707.
Crowell Elevator Co. v. Kerr Gifford & Co. 236
P. 1047; 114 Ore. 675; Johnson v. Geddes, 161 P.
910; 49 Utah 137.
In this case, when the Toone exchange was being written up and Exhibit 7 executed and later
when plaintiff prepared Exhibit 8 he made no mention whatever about being entitled to the $4,000.00
or any additional commission. It is inconceivable
that he would have ignored this if in fact he felt he
was entitled thereto, especially since Exhibit 7 clearly states that $2,000.00 is to be the entire commission for the Toone exchange, which included the two
duplexes in question. The testimony is conclusive
that this matter was discussed before Burton would
agree to the Toone exchange, and it was definitely
agreed that defendant was not liable for any more
commission for sale of the two duplexes beyond the
$2,000.00 contingent fee referred to in Exhibit 7,
and then, and only then, did defendant consent to
sign Exhibit 7, and Exhibit 3. (R. 35, 191, 193, 194,
229).
Between February 17, 1953, when Exhibit 2
was executed, and December 1953, when the complaint was filed, not one word was said by plaintiff
to defendant about this supposed $4,000.00 additional commission or about any more commission
due except the $2,000.00 claimed under Exhibit 7
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( R. 37, 231-2). Yet he was hounding defendant constantly about the $2,000.00. If he had really claimed
or felt he was entitled to an additional $4,000.00, he
most certainly would have mentioned it and demanded payment of that also. Clearly, this is an afterthought with him.
This should dispose of plaintiff's claim as it was
disposed of by the lower court, and the court's decision on this particular matter should be affirmed.
POINT III.
BOTH COMMISSION AGREEMENTS, EXHIBIT 2 AND EXHIBIT 7, REFER TO AND
COVER THE COMMISSION TO BE PAID
PLAINTIFF FOR THE ONLY SALE MADE OF
THE TWO DUPLEXES. THEIR TERMS ARE
INCONSISTENT. THEREFORE THE LATTER
ONE, EXHIBIT 7, SUPERCEDES AND RESCINDS THE EARLIER ONE, EXHIBIT 2, AND
CONSTITUTES THE ONLY AGREEMENT UPON THE SUBJECT ENFORCEABLE BETWEEN
THE PARTIES.
(a) Exhibit 7 was a contingent fee agreement.

The contingency never occurred, and no
commission became due pl:aintiff thereunder.

ARGUMENT
POINT III AND PARAGRAPH (a) THEREOF.
There is no dispute whatever in the testimony
to the effect that there was only one sale of the two
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duplexes by plaintiff, ie: the Toone exchange, Exhibit 3, and that no rental was received from the
pasture during the 1953 season.
Furthermore, no one can question that Exhibits
2 and 7 both refer to the same subject, ie: the com-

mission to be paid plaintiff for the sale of the two
duplexes, and that they are inconsistent on that subject. The first one, Exhibit 2, provides that plaintiff shall be entitled, in the event of a "sale" to "retain the excess of money" over $17,000.00 net, while
the second one, Exhibit 7, which refers to the only
disposition ever made of the two duplexes, ie: the
Toone exchange, Exhibit 3, says that as payment in
full for the exchange of, among other property, the
two duplexes, plaintiff shall receive a contingent fee
of $2,000. 00.
To the extent of this inconsistency, the law is
well settled that the later one rescinds and supercedes the earlier one and to that extent the earlier
one is merged in the later one.
Our own Supreme Court has settled this so far
as Utah is concerned in the case of Orpheus Vaudeville Co. v. Clayton Inv. Co. 128 P. 575, in the following language:
"In support of the first ground, counsel
for respondent vigorously insist that the
transaction between the parties to this case
is governed by the following rule, to-wit:
That where the parties to an existing agreement subsequently enter into a new one completely covering the same subject-matter contained in the first and the later agreement
contains terms inconsistent with the first one
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so that the two cannot stand together, the legal effect of the later agreement is to release
and supercede the former, and the later one
constitutes the only agreement upon the subject enforceable between the parties.
The rule that there cannot be two inconsistent, enforceable agreements between th£
parties covering the same subject-matter is
elementary.''
See to the same effect: The Idaho case of Bruce
v. Oberbillig, 268 P. 35; Housekeeper Pub. Co. v.
Swift (C.C.A.) 97 F. 290; Bourn v. Dowdell, 50 P.
695; Youngberg v. Warehouse Company 171 P. 97.
It is well put in the syllabus to Gladys Bell Oil
Company v. Clark, supra,
"A written contract may be discharged,
rescinded, altered, or changed at anytime before performance thereof is due, by the execution of a new agreement in writing and,
when such is done, the terms and provisions
of the new agreement govern as to the rights
of the parties thereto".
The Washington Supreme Court has thus
spoken, in Smith v. Cadillac Motor Car Company,
277 P. 453:
"It is undoubtedly the law that the legal
effect of a subsequent contract between the
same parties and covering the same subject
matter as an earlier agreement between them
containing terms inconsistent with the prior
contract so that the two cannot stand together is to rescind the earlier contract".
Sherman v. Sweeney, 29 Washington 321, 69
P. 1117.
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Having heretofore, in this Brief, analyzed the
evidence having to do with the execution of Exhibits
2 and 7, and surrounding circumstances, including
the conversation at the time of the execution of Exhibit 2, to the effect that the additional commission
on the two duplexes was based on a cash sale; the
conversation which preceded the signing of Exhibit
7 and then Exhibit 3, to the effect that defendant
would not agree to the Toone exchange until it was
thoroughly understood and agreed that the $2,000.00
contingent fee provided in Exhibit 7 was the total
commission to be paid for sale of the two duplexes
and other property in said transaction ; and the fact
that plaintiff never once referred to or demanded
the $4,000.00 or any other commission except the
$2,000.00 until this action was filed, we shall refrain
from repeating same and simply refer the court
thereto in support of this point in our Brief.
We maintain that the trial court was correct
in its interpretation of Exhibit 2, so far as it applies
to the necessity of a cash sale or sale for money, to
entitle plaintiff to the commission he seeks and since
none was made, plainiff became entitled to none.
However, we go further, and say that plaintiff
has a further and insurmountable hurdle which he
cannot negotiate, ie: even if he could, by any stretch
of the imgination, be held, except for Exhibit 7, to
have performed under Exhibit 2, so as to be entitled
to an additional commission, he is estopped to claim
it, because, before he disposed of the two duplexes,
he entered into the agreement, Exhibit 7, covering
the same subject; that the two agreements are in-
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consistent, and that the later one prevails and rescinds and supercedes the earlier one and he can look
alone to Exhibit 7.
As is pointed out in great detail in Point I of
this Brief, plaintiff never performd the contingency
which would entitle him to a commission under Exhibit 7.
CONCLUSION

Defendant respectfully submits:
(a) That the lower court erred in its findings
and decree awarding plaintiff a $2,000.00 judgment
under Exhibit 7, and that the decision on this point
should be reversed.

(b) That the trial court correctly construed
Exhibit 2, to require a sale for.cash or money to entitle plaintiff to further commission, and correctly
found that no such sale was made and that therefore
no commission became due plaintiff under Exhibit 2.
The judgment on this point should be affirmed.
(c) That the lower court erred in its finding
#8, that Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 7 did not merge but

remained separate and distinct agreements throughout the dealings between plaintiff and defendant.
That on the contrary, Exhibit 2 was rescinded and
replaced by Exhibit 7 and to the extent of this inconsistency, merged with Exhibit 7, and that plaintiff never performed under Exhibit 7 so as to entitle him to any further commission, either the
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$4,000.00 claimed under Exhibit 2 or the $2,000.00
claimed under Exhibit 7.

Respectfully submitted,
VERNON ROMNEY and ROMNEY & NELSON
Counsel for Respondent and Cross-Appellant
Received three copies of the foregoing Brief
this ________ day of April, 1955.
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, ROBERTS
& BLACK and DWIGHT L. KING,
Counsel for Appellant.
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